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STUDENT NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT - INJUSTICE FOR ALL
Can we forget for whom we are forming a Government? Is it for
men, or for the imaginary beings called States?
James Wilson1
The concept of sovereign immunity has long been a vibrant
force in American law, overshadowing the inequities it created by
the theory that government was responsible only for those wrongs
it chose to recognize from a moral consciousness inherent within
the state. When the thirteen colonies banded together to form the
union known as the United States of America, state government
played a relatively minor role in the lives of the people. Of the few
disputes that did arise between states and citizens, mainly pay-
ment of bond obligations incurred during the Revolutionary War,
most were settled out of court.2 As the role of government in the
lives of its people has expanded, so have the claims against the
state for wrongs done by the state to the people. However, when
recovery has remained a matter discretionary with the state, an
increasing number of wrongs committed have remained uncom-
pensated. The state may simply choose not to recognize such
wrongs, and the injured citizen is thus left without a remedy. The
recent increase in civil rights legislation has demonstrated the
shortcomings inherent in a system where the wrongdoer alone is
left to decide whether to make redress for the damages it has
caused. At best, such a system provides incongruous relief to those
similarly injured; at worst, all recovery is denied.
Federal and state governments have begun chipping away at
the immunity doctrine through both the legislature and the judici-
ary. One great obstacle, however, still stands in the way of provid-
ing relief to those injured by acts of government. The eleventh
amendment to the United States Constitution3 remains immova-
I 1 THE Raconns OF THE FEDERL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 483 (M. Farrand ed.
1937).
2 C. JAcoBs, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 69 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as JAcOBS].
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XI provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
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ble in the face of this expanding scope of recovery for wrongs com-
mitted by government upon its people. Because of its constitu-
tional nature, it has withstood all direct attacks upon a state's
sovereign immunity in the federal courts, yielding only to the crea-
tion of fictions by which its effect is circumnavigated.4 The hard-
ships5 it has wrought have far outweighed the good it was to have
brought when incorporated into the Constitution in 1798. This note
will examine the reasons for the passage of the amendment and its
subsequent ramifications in American law. Its contemporary ef-
fects will be noted, particularly with reference to civil rights ac-
tions. Attention will also be directed to potential solutions to the
problems it has created and continues to foster.
I. HiSTOICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
The eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution
was adopted in 1798, a direct result of the United States Supreme
Court decision in Chisholm v. Georgia,' permitting recovery of a
debt by the executors of a South Carolina citizen against the State
of Georgia. Whatever had been the intention of the framers of the
Constitution with respect to the suability of the state, the eleventh
amendment was intended to settle the question in favor of state
sovereign immunity.7 The amendment was meant to reverse the
Court's holding in Chisholm and to return the states to their prior
status. That status, however, became conclusive only as a result
of the amendment. Prior to Chisholm, the question of suability was
an open one, merely waiting for a challenge in which the interpre-
tation of section two, article three of the Constitution could be
finalized.
Article three, section two of the United States Constitution
provides in part:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority;-. . . to Controversies to which the United States
shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more
States;-between a State and Citizens of another State ....
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
See notes 134-47 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 185-86 infra and accompanying text.
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
JACOBS at 65-69.
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The section lends itself to two views of interpretation, one based
on a literal reading, the other couched in the background of Eng-
lish legal history. Depending upon which view is adopted, one will
find the state either amenable to suit or immune absent its consent
to be sued. The Court in Chisholm adopted the literal interpreta-
tion; the eleventh amendment was based on the historical ration-
ale. Both theories found support among the framers of the Consti-
tution who apparently came to no final decision regarding its
meaning.8
A. The Debates in the State Conventions
After the drafting of the Constitution was completed in 1787,
there remained the arduous task of obtaining the approval of the
conventions of nine states to implement the Constitution. Vigorous
debates over its ratification followed in several states, but the fed-
eral judiciary was one of the lesser discussed topics.' A primary
weakness of the Articles of Confederation had been the lack of a
federal judiciary, and most delegates acknowledged the need for
reform in this area in the new Constitution.'0 The issue of the
suability of a state was not overlooked entirely, however, as it was
discussed in the conventions of at least six states.
Pennsylvania was the first of the states to criticize the judici-
ary article, but few of these criticisms centered on the extension
of the judicial power to controversies between a state and citizens
of other states or foreigners. James Wilson, who later sat on the
United States Supreme Court when the Chisholm case was de-
cided, nevertheless chose to explain the effect of the article to the
convention. Regarding controversies between a state and citizens
of another state, he noted: "When a citizen has a controversy with
another state, there ought to be a tribunal where both parties may
stand on a joint and equal footing."'" Objection was made to juris-
diction of disputes to which the United States was a party based
on the ground that "the sovereignty of the states is destroyed, if
they should be engaged in a controversy with the United States,
because a suiter in a court must acknowledge the jurisdiction of
that court, and it is not the custom of soverigns to suffer their
'See notes 9-47 infra and accompanying text.
JACOBS at 27.
" JACOBS at 22.
2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVwNTIONs, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUON 491 (J. Elliot ed. 1876) [hereinafter cited as DEBATES].
[Vol. 77
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names to be made use of in this manner."' 2 Wilson replied, "The
answer is plain and easy: the government of each state ought to
be subordinate to the government of the United States."'3
Wilson expounded upon these views in 1791, only two years
prior to Chisholm. When a state or the nation is party to a dispute,
"the state or nation ought itself to be amenable before the judicial
powers. This principle, dignified because it is just is expressly
ratified by the constitution of Pennsylvania. It declares that suits
may be brought against the commonwealth."" With regard to the
sovereignty of the states, he said:
The dignity of the state is compounded of the dignity of its
members. If the dignity of each singly is undiminished, the
dignity of all jointly must be unimpaired.
Is a man degraded by the manly declaration, that he ren-
ders himself amenable to justice? Can a similar declaration
degrade a state?
To be priviledged from the awards of equal justice, is a
disgrace instead of being an honor; but a state claims a privilege
from the awards of equal justice, when she refuses to become a
party.. .. Is
Apparently the Pennsylvania convention was satisfied with
Wilson's explanation of the judicial power encompassed within the
Constitution; they ratified it without qualification. Although the
anti-Federalists proposed several amendments, none of which were
adopted, not one dealt with the extension of judicial power to
controversies between a state and citizens of another state. 6
There is no record that Massachusetts considered the suabil-
ity question in its convention. While the provision was not without
criticism from prominent citizens, 7 the Constitution was ratified
with the article in its original form.
In Virginia the suability doctrine met perhaps its stiffest oppo-
sition. Edmund Randolph first raised the subject of the judiciary
article on June 10, 1788.18 Randolph favored it highly because he
believed it would force Virginia to pay her debts, prevent the im-
", Id. at 490.
13 Id.
" 2 THE WORKS OF JAMEs WILSON 151 (J. Andrews ed. 1896).
Id. at 153.
, See JAcoBs at 29.
JAcoas at 30-31.
3 D rATFrs at 207.
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pairment of contracts by states, and prohibit tender laws." Patrick
Henry was thoroughly alarmed over the proposition. On June 12,
he stated: "A state may be sued in the federal court, by the paper
on your table. It appears to me, then, that the holder of the paper
money may require shilling for shilling. If there be any latent rem-
edy to prevent this, I hope it will be discovered."2 The problem
that Henry feared was that Virginia and other states might be
required to redeem the depreciated Continental paper and other
obligations at face value. On June 17, he continued in the same
vein, convinced that the Northerners holding the depreciated cur-
rency could sue and obtain judgment in federal court against the
state.2' The only apparent escape from this was by way of an ex
post facto law that was itself prohibited by the Constitution."
George Nicholas, a proponent of ratification, answered Henry
that the Continental debts were those of Congress, and it alone
would determine the ones that were valid." He perceived no au-
thority in the judiciary act permitting Congress to be sued in the
very courts it created. He noted that Congress could be the plain-
tiff in a suit but not a defendant. "But the individual states, per-
haps, may be sued." 4 President Edmund Pendleton found the
judiciary article applicable to matters of "general and not local
concern;" "the necessity and propriety of a federal jurisdiction, in
all such cases, must strike every gentleman."2
What struck George Mason was not the "necessity and pro-
priety" of the federal jurisdiction, but the absurdity of its appar-
ently unlimited scope. Jurisdiction of disputes between a state and
citizens of another state was "utterly inconsistent with reason or
good policy." Although he believed that the British debts should
be paid, enforcement of a judgment against a state created a pract-
ical problem. "It would be ludicrous to say that you could put the
11 Tender laws required acceptance of paper money on an equal basis with
specie. As the paper money depreciated with each additional issuance, creditors
began refusing to accept it despite the state law. F. BATES, RHODE ISLAND AND THE
FORMATION OF THE UMON 147-48 (Studies in History, Economics and Public Law No.
27, 1898).
3 DEBATES at 319.
29 Id. at 461, 474-75.
Id.; U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10.
3 DEBATEs at 476.
Id. at 477.
Id. at 518.
Id. at 523.
[Vol. 77
5
Gosnell: Constitutional Law--The Eleventh Amendment--Injustice for All
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2019
STUDENT NOTES
state's body in jail. How is the judgment, then, to be enforced? A
power which cannot be executed ought not to be granted."' '
James Madison felt that Mason's attack upon the judiciary
was perhaps unwarranted. He stated:
It is not in the power of individuals to call any state into court.
The only operation it can have, is that, if a state should wish
to bring a suit against a citizen, it must be brought before the
federal court. . . .It appears to me that this can have no opera-
tion but this-to give a citizen a right to be heard in the federal
courts; and if a state should condescend to be a party, this court
may take cognizance of it.Y
Patrick Henry was unconvinced by Madison's remarks, par-
ticularly in reference to a state being plaintiff only in the federal
courts:
If gentlemen pervert the most clear expressions, and the usual
meaning of the language of the people, there is an end of all
argument. What says the paper? That it shall have cognizance
of controversies between a state and citizens of another state,
without discriminating between plaintiff and defendant. What
says the honorable gentleman? The contrary-that the state
can only be plaintiff. When the state is debtor, there is no
reciprocity. It seems to me that gentlemen may put what con-
struction they please on it.2'
Another attempt was made to allay the fears of the anti-
Federalists that the judicial power would allow the states to be
brought into federal court by a private citizen. John Marshall told
the convention that he hoped "that no gentleman will think that
a state will be called at the bar of the federal court.
• ..It is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power
should be dragged before a court. The intent is, to enable states
to recover claims of individuals residing in other states.""0
" Id. at 527. Mason proposed the following amendment:
[Tlhe judicial power shall extend to no case where the cause of action
shall have originated before the ratification of this Constitution, except
in suits for debts due to the United States, disputes between states about
their territory, and disputes between persons claiming lands under grants
of different states. In these cases there is an obvious necessity for giving
it retrospective power.
3 DEBATEs at 530.
21 3 DEsATEs at 533.
2 Id. at 543.
1 Id. at 555.
6
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Randolph did not concur in this conclusion noting,
"[W]hatever the law of nations may say, that any doubt respect-
ing the construction that a state may be plaintiff and not defen-
dant is taken away by the words where a state shall be a party."'31
No further comment on the provision was made during the Vir-
ginia convention, but it is evident that even the Federalists were
unable to agree among themselves regarding the correct interpreta-
tion of the phrase. Nevertheless, Virginia ratified the Constitution.
While an amendment was made that would have removed federal
jurisdiction from state-citizen controversies, adoption of this and
other amendments was not made a prerequisite to ratification.
New York also encountered considerable anti-Federalist senti-
ment toward ratification. No discussion of state suability is re-
corded in the convention records, but the issue was not ignored.
Letters of a Federal Farmer, an anti-Federalist tract written by
Virginian Richard Henry Lee and widely circulated in New York,
questioned the wisdom of permitting a state to be sued by a for-
eigner or citizen of another state.2 The writer was concerned about
debts incurred during the war that had now been defaulted upon.
As such remedies had not been considered by either the states or
their creditors when the contracts were made, Lee believed "the
new remedy proposed to be given in the federal courts, can be
founded on no principle whatever."
After treating the subject superficially in The Federalist,
Number 80, Alexander Hamilton went into some detail in Number
8111 to assure the anti-Federalists that nothing in the new Consti-
tution would permit suits to be brought against a state where the
right had not existed previously. Hamilton believed that it was
beneath the dignity of a state to be brought before one of the lower
courts. In a vigorous assertion of state sovereignty, he said:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amena-
ble to the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the
general sense, and the general practice of mankind; and the
exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now en-
joyed by the government of every State in the Union. Unless,
therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of
31 Id. at 573.
Lee, Letters of a Federal Farmer, in Em, mAND NATION 117 (W. Leuchten-
berg and B. Wishy eds. 1970).
3 Id.
3 THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 119 (M. Dunne pub. 1901) (A. Hamilton).
[Vol. 77
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the convention, it will remain with the States, and the danger
intimated must be merely ideal.n
New York evidently feared, as Virginia did, that the new Con-
stitution provided for suits against the state, because an amend-
ment was proposed that would have removed such jurisdiction. 6
The Constitution was ratified without the amendment, although
New York did call for a second federal convention to make changes
in the document." While neither Virginia nor New York adopted
amendments affecting federal jurisdiction, both states felt com-
pelled to propose amendments that would have deleted the ques-
tioned provision. Undoubtedly, if neither state had believed the
federal judicial power encompassed disputes between a state and
other citizens or foreigners, they would not have bothered to rec-
ommend amendment of the phrase.
North Carolina originally rejected the Constitution, refusing
to ratify it until 1789, after the establishment of the new govern-
ment.2 Fear of suits brought against the state for redemption of
war debts was an important issue. Most discussions of the problem
were rather general, however, with only one delegate, William R.
Davie, a Federalist, recorded as commenting on the question. 9 He
believed the provision "necessary to secure impartiality in deci-
sions, and preserve tranquillity among the states."'" His was not
the majority viewpoint,41 however, and a proposed amendment
limiting federal judicial power would have deprived the courts
completely of jurisdiction in such matters.2
Id. at 125-26.
See JAcoas at 37. By a vote of 31-29 the New York Convention had previously
refused to approve a motion limiting the state's obligations under the new federal
government until a second convention could be called to consider amendments. 2
DEBATES at 411-12.
Amendments proposed by Delegate Samuel Jones included:
Res. 4. Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that nothing in
the Constitution now under consideration contained, is to be construed
to authorize any suit to be brought against any state, in any manner
whatever.
Res. 5. Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that the judicial
power of the United States, in cases in which a state shall be a party, is
not to be construed to extend to criminal prosecutions.
Id. at 409.
" 2 DEBATES at 413-14.
See JAcOBS at 38.
' See JAcoBS at 37.
o 4 DEBATES at 159.
JACOBS at 38.
42 The proposed amendment read:
8
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Rhode Island did not even call a state convention concerning
ratification of the Constitution until 1790.11 One proposed amend-
ment stated that "the judicial power of the United States, in cases
in which a state may be a party, does not extend to criminal
prosecutions, or to authorize any suit by any person against a
state."'" Rhode Island, a paper money state, feared the extension
of federal jurisdiction as it perceived it under the new Constitution
because of the potential adverse effect on its money situation.,'
The anti-Federalists clearly believed the states to be suable
under the judiciary article. The Federalists were divided, with
Randolph, Mason, Wilson, and Henry (not a delegate to the Phila-
delphia convention) agreeing 'with the anti-Federalists, 6 while
Madison, Hamilton, and Marshall (also not a delegate) arguing
that the provision extended federal jurisdiction over the state in a
suit by a citizen no further than it had reached prior to the Consti-
tution.7 There was no resolution of the issue. The fears entertained
by each delegate were apparently placated sufficiently to permit
most of them to vote for ratification. The overriding point is that
one who depends upon the Framers for the interpretation of the
phrase extending federal judicial power "to Controversies between
a State and Citizens of another State" receives little guidance. The
Framers themselves could not agree on the meaning. With such
confusion over the issue, it is evident that the prevailing opinion
regarding the suability of the states was not one of sovereign im-
munity, as would later be proclaimed by defenders of state immun-
ity.
That the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such courts of admiralty as Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish in any of the different states. The
judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under
treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United
States; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other foreign ministers, and
consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controver-
sies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between
two or more states, and between parties claiming lands under the grants
of different states.
4 DEBATEs at 246.
4 See JAcoBs at 38-39.
44 Id.
" See F. BATEs, supra note 19, at 107-48.
" See notes 9-27 supra and accompanying text.
'7 See notes 28-30, 34, 35 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 77
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B. The Suits Against the States
The Judiciary Act, implementing Article Il of the Constitu-
tion, was adopted by Congress in 1789.48 Its terms are no more lucid
than those of the Constitution, thus leaving the suability question
unanswered. It is within this equivocal framework that the first
case naming a state as defendant arose.
Vanstophorst v. Maryland" was instituted in 1791 by two
Dutch creditors seeking recovery of loans made to Congress and the
states during the War. The governor, executive council, and attor-
ney general of the state were served without protest. This was the
first case in which the United States Supreme Court asserted juris-
diction over a state, but its effect was somewhat muted by Mary-
land's recognition of the debt and eventual payment.
New York was next, being sued in assumpsit by the adminis-
trator of the estate of a Pennsylvania citizen." New York was not
complacent about the matter, protesting jurisdiction vehemently,
but judgment was nevertheless entered against the state. New
York's objections to the suit were minor compared to those of Geor-
gia when Chisholm v. Georgia5 ' was instituted in August 1792.11
New York had appeared to defend on the issue of jurisdiction, but
Georgia refused any appearance. The state was outraged over the
case and apparently felt that any appearance on its part would be
a humiliating concession.
The facts of Chisholm are unclear, but one authority states
that the suit was brought by Alexander Chisholm, executor of the
estate of Robert Farquhar, a deceased South Carolina merchant
who had supplied Georgia with war supplies in 1777.11 Farquhar
had not been paid for the supplies, and his executor brought suit
for payment against the State of Georgia in the United States
District Court for the Georgia District. Georgia asserted immunity,
and the circuit court agreed with the state and dismissed the ac-
Act of Sept. 9, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 401 (1791).
Oswald v. New York, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 401 (1792). "The facts of Oswald v.
New York were not reported by Dallas. The background of the case has been
reconstructed from the Oswald v. New York case file in the National Archives. The
file is incomplete, however, and many of the documents were badly damaged by
fire." JACOBS at 45n.13.
' 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
52 JACOBS at 46. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419.
JACOBS at 47.
10
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tion. Chisholm filed an original bill in the United States Supreme
Court and retained Attorney General Edmund Randolph as coun-
sel. Randolph argued for default judgment when the state failed
to appear. While recognizing that he represented an unpopular
position, he stated that normally the opinions of other states might
influence him; "but on this, which brings into question a constitu-
tional right, supported by my own conviction, to surrender it would
in me be official perfidy."54
The motion for default judgment discussed four issues that the
Court had designated previously for argument. Only one received
extensive treatment-whether the State of Georgia could be made
a defendant in a case before the United States Supreme Court
brought by a private citizen. The argument had a dual basis:
1st. That the Constitution vests a jurisdiction in the Su-
preme Court over a State, as a defendant, at the suit of a private
citizen of another State.
2d. That the judicial act recognizes that jurisdiction. 5
Randolph began by analyzing the "letter of the Constitution,
or rather the influential words of the clause in question." 8 He
found nothing in the language that would yield an interpretation
permitting states to be only plaintiffs in a suit. The Constitution
extended federal jurisdiction over cases in which a state was a
party, and a defendant was as much a party as a plaintiff.
He then turned to the spirit of the Constitution, which he
called its "genuine and necessary interpretation." 7 After enumer.
ating various unconstitutional acts that a state might commit, he
concluded:
Are States then to enjoy the high privilege of acting thus emi-
nently wrong, without controul; or does a remedy exist. The love
of morality would lead us to wish that some check should be
found; if the evil, which flows from it, be not too great for the
good contemplated. The common law has established a princi-
ple, that no prohibitory act shall be without its vindicatory
quality; or in other words, that the infraction of a prohibitory
law, although an express penalty be omitted, is still punish-
able.5'
" Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 419-20 (1793).
0 Id. at 420.
5"Id.
Id. at 421.
Id. at 422.
[Vol. 77
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Randolph went on to point out problems that would arise if private
citizens were left without a remedy against the state. For example,
if a state impaired the obligation of her own contracts, a suit
against the state would be the only way to rectify such a situation.
In his argument before the Supreme Court, Randolph ob-
served that there was no question that one state could sue another,
which, he reasoned, should also permit an individual wronged by
a state to sue the state. He continued:
A distinction between the cases is supportable only on a sup-
posed comparative inferiority of the Plaintiff. But the framers
of the Constitution could never have thought thus. They must
have viewed human rights in their essence, not in their mere
form. They had heard, seen-I will say felt; that Legislators
were not so far sublimed above other men, as to soar beyond the
region of passion. Unfledged as America was in the vices of old
Governments, she had some incident to her own new situation:
individuals had been victims to the oppression of States."
Randolph was appealing to the reason of the Court, reminding it
that states could and did commit unconstitutional acts and no
reason existed why the right of the state should be superior to those
of the people who had created the state. He believed that the states
had surrendered a part of their sovereignty with the creation of the
Union. While this alone was not sufficient reason to make the
states suable, the language of the Constitution was, and he found
no bar to a suit against the state within its discourse."
Default judgment was granted by the Court with only Justice
Iredell dissenting. Iredell spoke first, basing his opposition on his
belief that no legislature had authorized a compulsory suit to re-
cover monetary relief at the time of the adoption of the Constitu-
tion or the passage of the Judiciary Act. The principles of law
controlling could only be those common to all the states. He
stated:
I know of none such, which can affect this case, but those that
are derived from what is properly termed "the common law," a
law which I presume is the ground-work of the laws in every
State in the Union, and which I consider, so far as it is applica-
ble to the peculiar circumstances of the country, and where no
special act of Legislature controuls it, to be in force in each
" Id. at 422-23.
'o Id. at 423-25.
12
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State, as it existed in England, (unaltered by any statute) at
the time of the first settlement of the country.01
Iredell believed that the United States had only that authority
expressly delegated to it by the states. He found no instance where
any state legislature had given up its immunity and, therefore,
found no historical basis for this immunity to be surrendered to the
national government. He found the judicial authority of the United
States to extend "only to the decision of controversies in which a
State is a party .. ." He interpreted this as bestowing jurisdic-
tion only in those cases "in which a State can be a party. . .. "I'
No new remedies had been provided; as he saw it, the federal
judicial power merely provided a forum for existing remedies. If a
suit against the state could have been maintained at common law,
then it could be maintained here. If not, then Iredell found that
regardless of the interpretation given the Constitution and the
power vested in Congress, such a suit was not authorized. The only
remedy against the state's wrongful act was the type provided
against the English crown, a Petition of Right."
Justice Iredell was alone in his interpretation of the suability
question; Justices Blair, Wilson, and Cushing, and Chief Justice
Jay rendered opinions supporting the expanded concept of federal
jurisdiction. Justice Blair found the United States Constitution to
be the only authority in question since all states had adopted it
and thus submitted themselves to its judicial authority.A5 His argu-
ment was that "if sovereignty be an exemption from suit in any
other than the sovereign's own Courts, it follows that when a State,
by adopting the Constitution, has agreed to be amenable to the
judicial power of the United States, she has in that respect, given
up her sovereignty."6
Justice Wilson began his opinion by asking, "[D]o the people
of the United States form a Nation?"7 He approached the issue
from two angles: (1) the general jurisprudence and (2) laws and
practice of particular States and Kingdoms. With respect to the
SI Id. at 435.
62 Id. at 436.
63 Id.
1, A discussion of the origin of the Petition and its status in England at the
time of the adoption of the United States Constitution ensued as justification for
his position. Id. at 437-46.
Id. at 450.
"Id. at 452.
Id. at 453.
[Vol. 77
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general jurisprudence, he tackled the question of what is a state
and then examined the concept of sovereignty. Combining the two
ideas in the context of the current dispute, he concluded that "(a)s
to the purposes of the Union. . . Georgia is NOT a sovereign
state," for the people of Georgia did not surrender the sovereign
power to the state when forming the Union, but retained it for
themselves. 8 Wilson acknowledged William Blackstone's concept
of a sovereign king in the English system who is immune from suit
since no court has jurisdiction over him "for all jurisdiction implies
superiority of power." 9 He then set forth the principle that he
found as "the basis of sound and genuine jurisprudence; laws de-
rived from the pure source of equality and justice must be founded
on the Consent of those whose obedience they require. The
sovereign, when traced to his source, must be found in the man."7
In the second phase of his analysis he considered the feudal source
of sovereignty and instances in the European countries where such
sovereignty was challenged and found to be less than absolute. The
English permitted the King to be sued only by Petition, but he
found this to be a "difference . . . only in the form, not in the
thing."' Thus, even the King was not above the law.
Wilson suggested that the people of the states creating the
Constitution, that included citizens of Georgia, could bind the
states by the legislative, executive, and judicial power vested in
the Constitution. 2 The people could diminish or enlarge the power
of the states, as well as extinguish or transfer it, and as he expressly
noted, could "vest jurisdiction or judicial power over those States
and over the State of Georgia in particular."73 He then questioned
whether the Constitution had done this. It was his opinion that the
people of the United States intended the Constitution to bind not
only individuals but also the states by the legislative, executive,
and judicial powers of the national government.7
Justice Cushing, looking at the language of the Constitution
itself, dismissed the theory that English common law should gov-
ern. 5 He found Article III to be an express limitation upon the
Id. at 457.
" Id. at 458.
70 Id. at 459.
7' Id. at 459-60.
72 Id. at 463.
71 Id. at 464.
7' Id.
71 Id. at 466.
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power of the states, no more severe than the restrictions with re-
spect to treaties and the coining of money.76
Chief Justice Jay posed three questions that he felt were es-
sential to solving the problem of whether a state could be sued by
a private citizen of another state. First, he inquired concerning the
nature of the sovereignty of the state of Georgia; second, whether
such sovereignty necessarily precluded suability; and third,
whether the Constitution permits a suit against a state." Examin-
ing the first question, he found sovereignty to be "the right to
govern" which resided in a nation or state.78 In Europe, such sover-
eignty was given the Prince, but, in the United States, it was
accorded the people. He found governors to be agents of the people,
holding no greater sovereignty than that which they enjoy as pri-
vate citizens.7 9
Because one state suing another state is nothing more than all
the citizens of the first state suing all the citizens of the second
state, he concluded that a state could be sued, and, consequently,
suability and sovereignty were not incompatible. He could find no
rationale for the distinction between permitting all the citizens of
a state to sue another state while forbidding one citizen to sue a
different state. He noted the inequality inherent in the result,
particularly when the state could sue individual citizens."0 Jay
turned to the language of the Constitution for the answer to his
third question. He asked why, if states were to be only plaintiffs
in actions involving citizens, the Constitution did not so limit the
federal jurisdiction. "[I]f it meant to exclude a certain class of
these controversies, why were they not expressly excepted; on the
contrary, not even an intimation of such intention appears in any
part of the Constitution." He found the exception to the federal
judicial power urged by the state to be in direct conflict with a
major premise of the Constitution, the "establish[ment of] jus-
tice."8'
Based upon a strict reading of the Constitution, and led in its
interpretation by the principles of justice and unity underlying its
11 Id. at 468.
7 Id. at 470.
11 Id. at 472.
79 Id.
9 Georgia was at that time suing two South Carolina citizens. Georgia v.
Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 402, 415 (1792), 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 1 (1794).
S1 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 476-77.
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construction rather than English common law, the Court rendered
judgment for the plaintiff against the State of Georgia. The jus-
tices decided that sovereignty indeed rested in the people, and it
was they who, creating both the state and the union, designated
the powers to the governments. The people thus could create a
national government that was superior in authority to the state
governments and, through each state's ratification of the national
Constitution, had expressly done so.
Entry of the default judgment against the state was delayed
until February 1794, at which time a writ of inquiry for damages
was awarded. The claim was settled by the state later that year,
and the writ was never executed.12 The case remained on the
Court's docket until 1798, when it was dismissed in Hollingsworth
v. Virginia."
C. The Eleventh Amendment
Georgia's indignation over the decision was soon made appar-
ent. When the Georgia legislature convened that fall, Governor
Edward Telfair called for a state delegation to seek a constitutional
amendment and urged other states to ratify it. Resentment was
so great that one section of the Georgia House bill provided for the
death penalty to anyone attempting to levy on the state for the
recovery of the Chisholm debt." The bill was rejected in the Sen-
ate, but, by then, support for a constitutional amendment was
increasing.
The wrath kindled in Georgia spread up the eastern seaboard
as similar suits were instituted against other states. The day after
the Chisholm decision, the Court ordered that default judgment be
entered against New York in Oswald v. New York 8 unless the
State appeared or showed cause for failure to do so." Virginia was
JAcoBs at 55.
81 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798). See notes 97-102 infra and accompanying text.
81 JAcoBs at 56.
81 For the text of the bill, see JAcoBs at 56, quoting from The Augusta Chroni-
cle, November 23, 1793.
- 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 401 (1792). See note 50 supra.
" With the plaintiff's consent, the case was continued until the February 1795
term. New York Governor George Clinton brought the matter to the attention of
the state legislature, but no decisive action was taken to resolve the question
whether the state would defend itself in the case. JAcoBs at 45.
During the February 1795 term of the Court, a jury was impaneled
to hear the Oswald case. An award in the amount of $5,315 damages and
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sued in Grayson v. Virginia" over the seizure of land for the public
domain allegedly owned by a fur trading company, while Massa-
chusetts was named defendant in Vassal v. Massachusetts, an ac-
tion brought by a Loyalist whose property was confiscated during
the war.8" Cutting v. South Carolina was brought by the executor
of the Prince of Luxembourg to recover a debt owed by South
Carolina because of a vessel owned by it." The final case to be
brought before the eleventh amendment settled the question was
also against Georgia. Moultrie v. Georgia' involved the state's
refusal to accept paper money in payment upon a contract for sale
of land. The land was subsequently sold, and the plaintiffs brought
suit for breach of contract.2
Two days after the Chisholm decision was rendered, the fol-
lowing amendment was introduced in the United States Senate:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not extend to any
suits in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or
subjects of any foreign State. 3
No action was taken on the proposed amendment, but the states
refused to let the issue die. Massachusetts and Virginia, both fac-
ing suits in the Supreme Court, introduced a resolution during the
Third Congress criticizing the Court's action. Various state legisla-
tures responded with resolutions of their own, most of which con-
curred in the condemnation of the Court.94
The final text of the amendment was proposed on January 2,
1794, and passed by both houses before spring. With fifteen states
$.06 costs, was rendered for the plaintiff; but the Court still hesitating,
entered judgment nisi, that is, a judgment to become effective unless the
state appeared to contest it. No appearance was subsequently entered,
and there is no record indicating whether the state satisfied the judgment
against it.
Id. at 46 (footnote omitted).
11 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 320 (1796). This case was later decided as Hollingsworth v.
Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).
11 JACOBS at 60. The case was docketed in the August 1793 term of the Supreme
Court. It is discussed in the minutes of the Supreme Court, August 6, 1793.
90 The case is unreported.
11 Also styled Huger v. Georgia, February 1797, Supreme Court docket. Part
of the case is reported in Huger v. South Carolina, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 339 (1797).
" JACOBS at 64.
'3 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 651-52 (1793).
' JACOBS at 65.
'5 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 25, 30, 476-77 (1794).
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now in the Union, twelve were needed for ratification. Although
the required number was attained that year, the amendment was
not officially adopted until 1798, because of the slow process of
transmitting notice of ratification."
Whether the amendment was retroactive was the issue in
Hollingsworth v. Virginia," decided in the February term of 1798.
United States Attorney General Lee submitted the question to the
Court: "Whether the Amendment did, or did not, supersede all
suits depending, as well as prevent the institution of new suits,
against any one of the United States, by citizens of another
State?""9 Rejecting arguments claiming improper form and proce-
dure in passage of the amendment, the Court replied affirmatively
to the question presented. Lee, in his argument, noted with respect
to the problem of retroactivity:
A law, however, cannot be denominated retrospective, or ex
post facto, which merely changes the remedy, but does not af-
fect the right: In all the states, in some form or other, a remedy
is furnished for the fair claims of individuals against the respec-
tive governments. The amendment is paramount to all the laws
of the union; and if any part of the judicial act is in opposition
to it, that part must be expunged. There can be no amendment
of the constitution, indeed, which may not, in some respect, be
called ex post facto; but the moment it is adopted, the power
that it gives, or takes away, begins to operate, or ceases to
exist."
In conclusion, the reporter noted:
The Court, on the day succeeding the argument, delivered
an unanimous opinion, that the amendment being constitution-
ally adopted, there could not be exercised any jurisdiction in
any case, past or future, in which a state was sued by the citi-
zens of another state, or by citizens, or subjects, of any foreign
state. 0
The immediate effect of the amendment was the dismissal of
all suits pending against states that had been brought before the
Supreme Court by private citizens. The Court in Hollingsworth
referred to the purpose of the amendment as restricting federal
JAcoBs at 67.
3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 378 (1798).
I' /d.
91 Id. at 381-82.
' Id. at 382.
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jurisdiction in areas where such jurisdiction had been expressly
conferred.10' Attorney General Lee had argued in support of the
retroactive application of the amendment: "From the moment
those who gave the power to sue a state, revoked and annulled it,
the power ceased to be a part of the constitution; and if it does not
exist there, it cannot in any degree be found, or exercised else-
where."1 ' The Court, in adopting this position, acknowledged that
the Constitution had in fact given the federal judiciary authority
over disputes arising between states and citizens of another state
and that it took a constitutional amendment to abrogate such
power. Prior to the ratification of the eleventh amendment, the
states lost on the jurisdictional issue in every case brought against
any of them by individual citizens. Adoption of the United States
Constitution by the states mandated the relinquishment of a part
of the sovereignty of each state. Recognition of this surrender of
authority was explicit in the opinions of the majority justices in
Chisholm. Only constitutional rescission of the power could return
to the states a part of the sovereignty they asserted was inherently
theirs.
H. SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION OF THE AMENDMENT
States' rights had been a prime political issue through the first
struggling years of the nation's development. Chisholm was a se-
vere setback to the states' rights theorists who continued to clash
with Federalists over the concept of a strong national government.
The eleventh amendment, though a clear victory for states' rights
advocates, was not as decisive as they assumed. Three major deci-
sions would soon redefine the role of the federal judiciary, shaping
it into a strong national system preeminent over state judiciaries
in federal matters.
A. Early Cases
Gideon Olmstead and other American seamen had been im-
pressed into the British Navy in 1778. They overcame their captors
and steered the British sloop back to the States where it was over-
taken by an armed brig belonging to the State of Pennsylvania.
Olmstead claimed the vessel as a war prize, but the Pennsylvania
admiralty court awarded him only a one-fourth interest. The re-
mainder was divided between the state and others assisting in the
"I, Id. at 381.
102 Id.
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sloop's capture. On appeal to the Committee of Appeals of the
Continental Congress, Olmstead's claim was sustained. The admi-
ralty court refused to recognize the decision and ordered proceeds
of the sale of the sloop be put in custody of the state treasurer.
Olmstead brought suit against the treasurer's heirs in federal dis-
trict court and, in 1803, Judge Richard Peters ruled in his favor.
The Pennsylvania Governor, condemning Judge Peter's action,
asserted the eleventh amendment as barring such a suit since the
state was the real defendant in the case, even though not so
named.' 3 Pandemonium followed in the state legislature where a
lengthy resolution was introduced urging disobedience of the court
order.' 4 The pressure was more than Judge Peters dared to con-
front, and he dropped the issue. But Olmstead wanted his money,
and in 1808 he petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of manda-
mus compelling Judge Peters to execute the judgment. Chief Jus-
tice Marshall, in United States v. Peters"' delivered the unani-
mous opinion the following year, commanding Peters to execute
the order. This was a devastating blow to the states and their claim
of sovereignty. Marshall declared, in his opinion:
If the legislatures of the several states may, at will, annul thejudgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the
rights acquired under those judgments, the constitution itself
becomes a solemn mockery, and the nation is deprived of the
means of enforcing its laws by the instrumentality of its own
tribunals."'
It was the Supreme Court that held the power to determine the
limits of federal judicial authority, not the state legislatures."7
Chief Justice Marshall made it clear that orders of the federal
courts must be obeyed by the states. A federal decision was bind-
ing upon all those affected by it, including the state. Marshall,
however, in rejecting the claim of immunity, took great care to
distinguish this case from one that operated directly against the
state and thus was barred by the eleventh amendment. While
Pennsylvania claimed the money from the sale of the sloop, it was
in the hands of her treasurer in his own name."' He intimated that
"3 United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 115-35 (1809).
"o Id. at 122-24.
"3 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809).
"3 Id. at 136.
,3' Id. at 139.
Id. at 140.
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had Pennsylvania had a legal right to the money, a different ques-
tion would have been presented to the Court. '
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, ' involved the enforcement of a
judgment recognizing Martin's title in some Virginia lands known
as Northern Neck. The United States Supreme Court had reversed
the ruling of the Virginia Court of Appeals which had found Vir-
ginia had perfected title in Northern Neck prior to the grant to
Hunter."' The Virginia Court refused to obey the Supreme Court's
order to enter judgment for Martin, finding section twenty-five of
the Judiciary Act unconstitutional."' While this case dealt with
the Judiciary Act and not the eleventh amendment, its effect in
asserting the supremacy of the federal judiciary should not be
understated. Justice Story, delivering the opinion of the Court,
dispelled any doubts existing about the authority vested in the
federal courts. He affirmed the appellate jurisdiction of the Court
over state cases involving federal statutory and constitutional is-
sues:
It has been argued, that such an appellate jurisdiction over
state courts is inconsistent with the genius of our governments,
and the spirit of the constitution. That the latter was never
designed to act upon state sovereignties, but only upon the
people, and that if the power exists, it will materially impair the
sovereignty of the states, and the independence of their courts.
We cannot yield to the force of this reasoning . . . . 3
Cohens v. Virginia"' rounded out the trilogy of early nine-
teenth century decisions establishing the supremacy of the federal
judiciary. The case arose during a time when secessionist views
were becoming more prevalent."' Chief Justice Marshall dealt a
critical blow to these states' rights supporters with his opinion in
Cohens, declaring the surrender of state sovereignty, "in many
instances, where the surrender can only operate to the benefit of
119 Id. at 141.
110 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
"' Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1812).
" Act of Sept. 9, 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 85.
"3 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 342-43.
"' 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). The court's appellate jurisdiction under
section twenty-five of the Judiciary Act was sustained with regard to review of state
criminal proceedings.
"I The case was decided at a time when the right of a state to secede from the
Union was being forcefully asserted. W. LOCKHART, Y. KAmsAR & J. CHOPER, CON-
STrrUTiONAL LAw 32-33 (1970).
[Vol. 77
21
Gosnell: Constitutional Law--The Eleventh Amendment--Injustice for All
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2019
STUDENT NOTES
the people, and where, perhaps, no other power is conferred on
Congress than a conservative power to maintain the principles
established in the constitution." ' 6 Marshall stated it was the duty
of the government to maintain these principles, and this could be
accomplished through the judicial department that had jurisdic-
tion of all cases arising under the constitution and laws of the
United States. "From this general grant of jurisdiction," he contin-
ued, "no exception is made of these cases in which a state may be
a party . . . . We think a case arising under the constitution or
laws of the United States, is cognizable in the Courts of the Union,
whoever may be the parties to that case." ' 7
Virginia raised the eleventh amendment as a defense in
Cohens, but the court rejected it, finding that while a state was not
suable without its consent, here Virginia had consented."' If the
state surrendered part of its sovereignty in an instrument, "it has
parted with this sovereign right of judging in every case on the
justice of its own pretensions, and has entrusted that power to a
tribunal in whose impartiality it confides.""'
Peters, Martin, and Cohens all broadened the scope of federal
judicial power at the expense of state sovereignty. It was apparent
that the Court interpreted the Constitution as limiting the power
of the states in favor of a strong national government. If there had
been no eleventh amendment restricting the Court, it is likely that
the states would have been found amenable to suit under all cir-
cumstances. Indeed, Marshall's language in Cohens suggests such
a result;'2 ' it is diminished only by prior language finding a waiver
of sovereignty.'"' Although bound by the eleventh amendment, the
Court gave it the narrowest construction possible to lessen its im-
pact on the Court's jurisdiction and ultimately on its ability to
render justice.
The federal judicial system was firmly entrenched as superior
to the state tribunals in federal matters as a result of these three
cases. The Court then began to interpret the eleventh amendment
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 382.
"T Id. at 282-83.
'' Virginia's consent was found inherent in her adoption of the United States
Constitution. The document, by its nature, was to be supreme in all applicable
areas. See generally the discussion by the Court at id. 378-89.
"' Id. at 380.
" Id. at 382.
222 Id. at 380.
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itself in light of this strong national judiciary. Chief Justice Mar-
shall's opinion in Osborn v. Bank of the United States'22 was une-
quivocal in its support of the broad role of the federal courts. The
amendment was given the most limited construction possible as
Marshall stated:
It may, we think, be laid down as a rule which admits of no
exception, that in all cases where jurisdiction depends on the
party, it is the party named in the record. Consequently, the
11th amendment, which restrains the jurisdiction granted by
the constitution over suits against States, is, of necessity, lim-
ited to those suits in which a State is a party on the record.1In
Marshall himself had difficulty confining the eleventh amend-
ment to such a narrow interpretation and soon construed it to
extend to the governor of a state. Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo'24
signified a definite departure from the limited holding in Osborn.
Madrazo had sued the Georgia governor for the return of slaves
allegedly wrongfully taken from him and for the proceeds received
from sale of other slaves to which he claimed ownership. Marshall
noted that the money demanded was in the state treasury mixed
with other state funds. He felt it significant that neither the money
nor the slaves had come into possession of the government by
violation of any act of Congress. ' Thus no allegation could be
'12 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). The president, directors, and company of the
Bank of the United States sought an injunction in the lower court against Ralph
Osborn, Auditor of the State of Ohio, to restrain him from acting against the
complainants under an act of the Ohio Legislature, passed February 8, 1819, and
entitled: "An act to levy and collect a tax from all banks, and individuals, and
companies, and associations of individuals that may transact banking business in
this State, without being allowed to do so by the law thereof." That act stated that
the Bank of the United States was acting contrary to state law and, if it continued
to do so beyond September first of that year, would be liable to an annual tax of
fifty thousand dollars for each office. The State Auditor was given the authority to
charge the tax to the Bank and to swear out a warrant for its collection. If the tax
was not paid he could levy on the Bank's assets and sell them if necessary.
The injunction was issued, but a tax collector subsequently dispatched by
Osborn seized from the Chilicothe office of the Bank $100,000 in specie and bank
notes. The money was delivered to the State Treasurer or Osborn, both of whom
allegedly had notice of the illegal seizure. Osborn and the tax collector were later
ordered by the court to return the money with interest to the Bank. The case in
the United States Supreme Court was an appeal from that decree. Id. at 739-44.
In Id. at 857.
iU 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110 (1828).
"n Id. at 123. Madrazo's vessel with its cargo of slaves was captured by a cruiser
commanded by an American citizen within the jurisdiction of American waters.
The vessel and slaves were taken to Amelia Island and condemned by a mock Court
[Vol. 77
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made that any official had acted in an unlawful manner that might
nullify the protection of the eleventh amendment. Marshall found
the claim against the governor to have been made in his official
capacity and that no decree could be rendered against him person-
ally. "In such a case, where the chief magistrate of a State is sued,
not by his name, but by his style of office, and the claim made
upon him is entirely in his official character, we think the State
itself may be considered as a party on the record. If the State is
not a party, there is no party against whom a decree can be made.
No person in his natural capacity is brought before the court as
defendant." 26
B. The Post-Civil War Period
Nearly fifty years passed before another major decision involv-
ing the eleventh amendment was rendered by the court. These fifty
years saw one of the most bitter wars in American history fought,
in part, over the question of states' rights. The Civil War resulted
in a stronger national government at the expense of state sover-
eignty; the judiciary could be expected to mirror the result.
In Davis v. Gray,12 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the doc-
trines of Osborn, thus permitting the suit even though Davis, Gov-
ernor of Texas, had been made a party.11 Davis foreshadowed fu-
of Admiralty. The vessel and cargo were sold to one Bowen who took them into
Florida. When found within the limits of the State of Georgia, they were seized by
a United State customs officer and delivered to an agent of the Georgia governor
under authority of a state legislative act passed in accordance with the provisions
of the Act of Congress of March 1807, which prohibited the importation of slaves
into the United States. Some of the slaves were then sold by the governor and
proceeds of the sale were paid over to the Georgia treasurer. The remaining slaves
were held in possession of an agent of the governor. The governor filed suit to obtain
their forfeiture so they could be sold and prevailed in district court. The case
reached the Supreme Court on appeal from the dismissal of Madrazo's suit for
return of the slaves which he claimed had been taken from him improperly and for
the return of the proceeds of those slaves already sold. Id. at 110-12.
,28 Id. at 123-24.
82 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203 (1872). The State of Texas had given public lands to
a company for the building of a railroad. When the company became insolvent
before completing the railroad, the state attempted to recover the lands. The lower
court decided that the secession of the state from the Union had made it impossible
for the company to fulfill the conditions that were therefore abrogated. Id. at 204-
15.
't' Davis and Madrazo are distinguishable as the Texas governor invoked an
invalid law in support of his position while the Court expressly noted that the
Georgia governor had not violated any law nor acted on the basis of any unconstitu-
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ture developments' broadening the area of permissible suits
against state officers. The conditions prerequisite to such suits, as
the Court found them expressed in Osborn, included a finding that
the officer was acting under an unconstitutional state or federal
law. 3' The Court also found that "making a State officer a party
does not make a State a party, although her law may have
prompted his action, and the State may stand behind him as the
real party in interest. A State can be made a party only by shaping
the bill expressly with that view . ".1.."31
The nominal party doctrine of Osborn was last asserted in
1882.132 The definitive question then became whether the state was
the real party in interest. If so, the state, even though not named
in the complaint as a party defendant, could claim immunity.'
The Court, while acknowledging the basic principle of state im-
munity, qualified its previous holding, finding such immunity to
exist only when the state was an indispensible party. 3' The mere
assertion of the immunity defense was not sufficient, however. An
officer charged with a wrongful act had to make an affirmative
showing that it was the state's act, not his, that caused the injury.
He was required to show the validity of the state law under which
he acted in order successfully to assert immunity.1" Such was the
tional statute. The distinction is crucial to the understanding of the Court's reason-
ing in applying eleventh amendment immunity. The theory would not be fully
expressed until Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), when the Court created the
fiction that an officer acting under an unconstitutional statute or in violation of a
statute was acting in a personal capacity and therefore could be sued while the
officer not acting outside his authority was not personally liable and enjoyed the
state's sovereign immunity.
12 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
' 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 220.
131 Id.
Extension of jurisdiction of suits against officers continued in Board of Liqui-
dation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531 (1875), when the Court found an officer performing
a purely ministerial duty could be compelled by mandamus to perform that duty
when his refusal to do so would cause personal injury. No defense was presented
by a showing that the officer acted pursuant to an unconstitutional law in failing
to perform his duty for "an unconstitutional law will be treated by the courts as
null and void." Id. at 541.
132 United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
I" Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 727 (1883); New Hampshire v. Louisiana,
108 U.S. 76, 89 (1883); Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52, 67 (1886).
'3 Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R., 109 U.S. 446, 457 (1883). The
limits of United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882), were examined and defined by
the Court, 109 U.S. at 452, and the soundness of Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
203 (1872), was questioned. 109 U.S. at 453.
1'3 Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 288 (1885).
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status of the law when In re Ayers '36 was decided in 1887. The
Court, finding "that the question whether a suit is within the
prohibition of the Eleventh Amendment is not always determined
by reference to the nominal parties on the record ... "I decided
that a suit against a state officer was not barred when his wrongful
action was an individual act, such as a trespass, but if his offense
was something that only the state acting through one of its officers
could do, then the official's defense that the suit was one against
the state would be sustained.' s While such a result seems reasona-
ble when viewed in terms of immunity attaching when the state is
the real party in interest, it fails to anticipate the problem that
arises when violation of the fourteenth amendment becomes an
issue. By its terms, only a state can violate the fourteenth amend-
ment, and, if the state is immune from suit when it is the real party
in interest, then, by necessity, it is immune from suit anytime it
is in violation of the fourteenth amendment. While the problem
did not arise in Ayers, the conflict was inevitable.
Inferences of potential problems arising from assertion of elev-
enth amendment immunity raised in the face of fourteenth amend-
ment violations first surfaced in 1903 in Prout v. Starr.13 While the
eleventh amendment was found inapplicable in this case,"' the
Court warned of the dangers in permitting it to be asserted so as
to nullify other provisions of the Constitution which accord specific
powers to Congress."' The Court's language was explicit; it saw the
123 U.S. 443 (1887).
,' Id. at 487, quoting Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 287 (1885).
0 123 U.S. at 488-89.
,' 188 U.S. 537 (1903).
0 Id. at 542-43. The Court held that the jurisdictional question had been
decided in a prior decision dealing with the same factual situation. Smyth v. Ames,
169 U.S. 466, 518-19 (1898):
[W]ithin the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution,
the suits are not against the State but against certain individuals charged
with the administration of a state enactment, which, it is alleged, cannot
be enforced without violating the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs.
It is the settled doctrine of this court that a suit against individuals for
the purpose of preventing them as officers of a State from enforcing an
unconstitutional enactment to the injury of the rights of the plaintiff, is
not a suit against the State within the meaning of that Amendment.
"I The Court noted:
It would, indeed, be most unfortunate if the immunity of the individual
States from suits by citizens of other States, provided for in the Eleventh
Amendment, were to be interpreted as nullifying those other provisions
which confer power on Congress to regulate commerce among the several
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problem and cautioned against the inherent evils of applying the
eleventh amendment without regard for the nature of the contro-
versy, but not having been expressly presented with the question
here, such fears could only be embodied in dicta to await a more
direct controversy."'
The question was squarely presented only five years later, in
Ex parte Young,' when the Minnesota legislature passed a law
reducing railroad rates accompanied by severe penalties for all who
refused to comply. 44 Suit was brought by stockholders of several
of the railroads to enjoin their respective companies from comply-
ing with the law on the basis that the new rates were unreasonable
and confiscatory and, thus, would result in a deprivation of com-
pany property without the due process of law required by the four-
teenth amendment."' Edward T. Young, Attorney General of Min-
nesota, was included among the defendants. The injunction was
issued over Young's objection that the suit was, in fact, one against
the state, and since the state had not consented, the suit was
barred by the eleventh amendment."4 The Court found the injunc-
tion proper. Justice Peckham, writing for the Court, set forth the
rule that has been consistently followed:
The. . . use of the name of the state to enforce an unconstitu-
tional act to the injury of the complainants is a proceeding
without the authority of, and one which does not affect, the
state in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an
illegal act upon the part of the state official .... If the act
which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a violation
States, which forbid the States from entering into any treaty, alliance or
confederation, from passing any bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law
impairing the obligation of contracts, or, without the consent of Congress,
from laying any duty of tonnage, entering into any agreement or compact
with other States, or from engaging in war-all of which provisions ex-
isted before the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, which still exist,
and which would be nullified and made of no effect, if the judicial power
of the United States could not be invoked to protect citizens affected by
the passage of state laws disregarding these constitutional limitations.
Much less can the Eleventh Amendment be successfully pleaded as an
invincible barrier to judicial inquiry whether the salutary provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment have been disregarded by state enactments.
188 U.S. at 543.
142 Id.
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
14 Id. at 127-28.
" Id. at 130.
"' Id. at 132.
[Vol. 77
27
Gosnell: Constitutional Law--The Eleventh Amendment--Injustice for All
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2019
STUDENT NOTES
of the federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such
enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of the
Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or
representative character and is subject in his person to the con-
sequences of his individual conduct.4 7
The decision opened up an entire new era of judicial actions.
While the railroads would have been without relief had the Court
found against them, of far more significance is the decision's im-
pact on constitutional law in general. Without Young, there would
be no effective method of challenging the constitutionality of a
statute. Any such suit must necessarily be brought against the
state in some manner. The eleventh amendment continues to bar
direct suits against the state, but when styled in the name of her
officers, constitutional assaults upon the validity of a statute have
proceeded without interference.
Young has had the most profound effect upon state sovereign
immunity, but several other cases dealing with collateral issues in
the interpretation of the eleventh amendment have had a signifi-
cant impact. Hans u. Louisiana' extended the amendment's pro-
hibition against suit to citizens of the state being sued. Though the
language of the amendment does not expressly extend to such
suits, the Court felt the reasoning'49 in the passage of the amend-
ment required such a result. While a state has immunity even
when confronted by its own citizens, only the state can claim the
immunity. A state-owned corporation was found liable to suit in
"I Id. at 159-60. Justice Harlan, in his dissenting opinion, argued that the suit
was, as to the defendant Young, one against him as, and only because he
was, Attorney General of Minnesota. No relief was sought against him
individually but only in his capacity as Attorney General. And the mani-
fest, indeed the avowed and admitted, object of seeking such relief was
to tie the hands of the State so that it could not in any manner or by any
mode of proceeding, in its own courts, test the validity of the statutes and
orders in question. It would therefore seem clear that within the true
meaning of the Eleventh Amendment the suit brought in the Federal
court was one, in legal effect, against the State-as much so as if the
State had been formally named on the record as a party-and therefore
it was a suit to which, under the Amendment, so far as the State or its
Attorney General was concerned, the judicial power of the United States
did not and could not extend.
Id. at 174. For comment on Justice Harlan's dissent see W. LocKHART, Y. KAmnsAR
& J. CHOPER, supra note 115, at 40.
" 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
"' Id. at 15.
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Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College.5 ' The Court, recogniz-
ing the sovereignty of the state, could find no sovereignty in the
corporation operated by agents of the state. Acts of the agents
caused the injury, and they must bear the responsibility for their
wrong. Counties were also found amenable to suit in Lincoln
County v. Luning,15 ' in which the Court held that the language of
the amendment could not be construed beyond its express wording
which mentioned only states.' Apparently the Court found a dif-
ferent way to read the amendment in the short time before the
Hans case was decided.
Waiver of the states' immunity has long been recognized,'
however, such a waiver must be express and cannot be effected
solely on the ground that the case arises under the Constitution or
laws of the United States. 5' Waiver must be express and in accord-
ance with state law.'55 A waiver is not to be lightly inferred, nor
does consent to suit in state court constitute consent to suit in
federal court.5 ' One apparent exception can be found to this gen-
1- 221 U.S. 636 (1911).
151 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
152 The test of whether a state agency can be sued in federal court is the
presence or nonpresence of the state as the real party in interest. Whitten v. State
Univ. Constr. Fund, 493 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1974). "Whether the Action is a suit
against a state within the meaning of the amendment is to be determined by the
character of the proceeding and the relief sought rather than the mere names of the
titular parties to the litigation." Kirker v. Moore, 308 F. Supp. 615, 624 (S.D.W.
Va. 1970), aff'd, 436 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 824 (1971).
State law determines whether an agency of the state is the "alter ego" of the
state. Harris v. Tooele County School Dist., 471 F.2d 218, 220 (10th Cir. 1973). Two
tests have been used to determine this: (1) whether the action could affect the
treasury of the state; (2) whether, when an action is sought to be compelled or
enjoined, full relief can be obtained from the named defendant without requiring
the state to take affirmative action. If the state is required to take affirmative
action, then the agency is the alter ego of the state. 21 Properties, Inc. v. Romney,
360 F. Supp. 1322, 1325 (N.D. Tex. 1973). Although no single factor is determina-
tive of the question of extending state immunity to an agency, United States Steel
Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 367 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), the financial
liability test appears to be the strongest indicator of state interest in the litigation.
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963);
Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1973);
Woody v. Chesa-Beach Park, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 525 (D. Md. 1972).
15 See, e.g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883).
'14 Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 186 (1964).
255 Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151 (1909).
l5 Petty v: Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 276 (1959).
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eral rule; when the state engages in certain activities under which
a cause of action is expressly created by federal statute."'
C. The Current Scene
1. Edelman v. Jordan
No major developments occurred in the interpretation or ap-
plication of the eleventh amendment until early in 1974, when the
Supreme Court decided Edelman v. Jordan."5' Illinois state and
county welfare officials were sued for administering public assis-
tance programs in accordance with state regulations that con-
flicted with, and were less favorable to recipients than, the federal
regulations. It was alleged that the program was administered in
violation of the fourteenth amendment and the appropriate federal
regulations. Declaratory and injunctive relief was sought. The dis-
trict court declared the Illinois regulations invalid where inconsist-
ent with the federal regulations and granted a permanent injunc-
tion requiring state compliance with the federal regulations., 9 The
district court also ordered the officials to pay the benefits wrong-
fully withheld.'60 The United States Court of Appeals affirmed."'
The United States Supreme Court reversed that portion of the
Court of Appeals decision that affirmed the district court's order
that retroactive benefits be paid by the Illinois officials.' 2 Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that the federal court's
remedial power is limited by the eleventh amendment to prospec-
tive injunctive relief and may not include an award of retroactive
benefits to be paid from the treasury.'63 He stated that "the rule
has evolved that a suit by private parties seeking to impose a
liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury
is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.""'
The Edelman decision cited with approval the observations of
Judge McGowan in Rothstein v. Wyman,'' dealing with the retro-
'IT See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (164), where consent to suit
in federal court was found implicit in the Federal Employers Liability Act, 45
U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970).
415 U.S. 651 (1974).
,' Id. at 656.
MO Id.
" Id. at 658. Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973).
182 415 U.S. at 659.
" Id. at 677.
"' Id. at 663.
" 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1973).
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active payment of benefits:
It is one thing to tell the Commissioner of Social Services
that he must comply with the federal standards for the future
if the state is to have the benefit of federal funds in the pro-
grams he administers. It is quite another thing to order the
Commissioner to use state funds to make reparation for the
past. The latter would appear to us to fall afoul of the Eleventh
Amendment if that basic constitutional provision is to be con-
ceived of as having any present force."'
Justice Rehnquist examined the background of the amend-
ment and, entertaining the question of its applicability in the in-
stant case, quoted from a prior decision of the Court: "When the
action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the State,
the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled
to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual
officials are nominal defendants."'' 7
The Court then considered the effect of Young on the case at
bar but concluded that it extended only to prospective injunctive
relief. It was concerned with the retroactive part of the district
court's award which "requires the payment of a very substantial
amount of money which that court held should have been paid, but
was not. .. ."I" The Court found it significant that the funds
would not come from the state officials themselves but rather
would come from.the Illinois state treasury. The Court thus found
that "the award iesembles far more closely the monetary award
against the State itself, Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury
• . .than it does the prospective injunctive relief awarded in Ex
parte Young.""'
Recognition was made of the fact that Young had probably
affected the state treasury in some away, and subsequent cases
likely permitted an even greater impact upon state revenues. How-
ever, the Court found the district court's decision to extend far
beyond any previous cases. The award required payment of state
funds as compensation for injuries resulting from the improper
administration of the welfare program rather than a mere conse-
quential monetary effect occasioned by a court-ordered change in
administrative procedures to operate only in the future. 7'
,68 Id. at 236-37.
" Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945).
88 415 U.S. at 664.
,' Id. at 665.
,' Id. at 668.
[Vol. 77
31
Gosnell: Constitutional Law--The Eleventh Amendment--Injustice for All
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2019
STUDENT NOTES
The impact of Edelman cannot be overstated. The Court even
went so far as to overrule portions of prior decisions awarding some
monetary relief against states as inconsistent with the tenor of the
eleventh amendment.' It was noted that the amendment had only
been considered in one of the cases and was given superficial treat-
ment there.' Any liberalization in the Court's attitude toward the
awarding of money damages against states and their officers was
effectively choked by the decision. The Court made it evident that
it would go no further in eroding the immunity doctrine than to
permit injunctive relief as contemplated in Young.7 3
Another distinction was made from former cases permitting
suit where the cause of action was created by Congress. 4 No Con-
gressional intention to abrogate state immunity was found in the
federal welfare program, and since constructive consent was not
sufficient to waive a constitutional immunity, state immunity
remained unabated. 17
5
M" Id. at 670-71. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), is the only case
that the Court recognized as presenting the eleventh amendment objection to retro-
active relief upon oral argument. The Court affirmed the judgment, however, with-
out dealing with the issue substantively. Summary affirmations of lower federal
court decisions that ordered payment of retroactive benefits and in which the elev-
enth amendment defense was raised also included: Sterrett v. Mothers' & Chil-
dren's Rights Organization, 409 U.S. 809 (1972), af'g unreported order and judg-
ment of the district court (N.D. Ind. 1972) on remand from Carpenter v. Sterrett,
405 U.S. 971 (1972); State Dep't of Health & Rehab. Serv. v. Zarate, 407 U.S. 918
(1972), aff'g 347 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp.
717 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), afl'd per curiam sub nom., Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49
(1970).
All of the above cases were disapproved to the extent that their holdings were
inconsistent with the holding in Edelman v. Jordan on the eleventh amendment
issue. 415 U.S. at 652.
' Id. at 670-71.
' Id. at 677.
' Id. at 671-72. The Court referred specifically to Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377
U.S. 184 (1964), where a cause of action was created under the Federal Employers
Liability Act, and Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275
(1959), involving a compact between the two named states.
The question of waiver or consent under the Eleventh Amendment was
found in those cases to turn on whether Congress had intended to abro-
gate the immunity in question, and whether the State by its participation
in the program authorized by Congress had in effect consented to the
abrogation of that immunity.
415 U.S. at 672.
"I5 Id. at 671-72. In Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944), the
Court noted: "[W]hen we are dealing with the sovereign exemption from judicial
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One more important question was treated in the majority
opinion. Consideration was given to the effect of section 1983 in
face of the eleventh amendment.
[]]t has not heretofore been suggested that § 1983 was intended
to create a waiver of a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity
merely because an action could be brought under that section
against state officers, rather than against the State itself.
Though a § 1983 action may be instituted by public aid recipi-
ents such as respondent, a federal court's remedial power, con-
sistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to
prospective injunctive relief. . . and may not include a retroac-
tive award which requires the payment of funds from the state
treasury .... "
The Court thus acknowledged the potential conflict between sec-
tion 1983177 and the eleventh amendment but found the force of the
latter superior. As section 1983 was enacted to implement the four-
teenth amendment, it could be argued that they are of equal force
if one considered only the language of each. However, the historical
basis of section 1983 casts it into a different context, permitting the
result which the Court reached and causing the inequities that
exist in the area of civil rights.
2. The Civil Rights Acts
The Ku Klux Klan Act, adopted April 20, 1871,111 established
civil liabilities for the deprivation of civil rights that now find
expression in section 1983. The Senate amended the original House
version of the bill, making cities and counties where violence oc-
curred liable in damages to the persons injured. The House refused
to accept the Senate version until the amendments were watered
interference in the vital field of financial administration a clear declaration of the
state's intention to submit its fiscal problems to other courts than those of its own
creation must be found."
176 Id. at 675-77. Compare Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970), permitting
suits in federal court under section 1983 to secure state compliance with provisions
of the Social Security Act.
7 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus.
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris.
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
"I Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
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down to provide liability only in case of conspiracy to violate civil
rights. Representative John Farnsworth presented one of the
strongest arguments against the Senate amendments as he at-
tacked them on the basis that Congress had no authority to "confer
any power or impose any duty upon the county or city. Can we then
impose on a county or other State municipality where we cannot
require a duty? I think not." ' Senator George Edmunds found the
bill as passed afforded substantially the same relief as the prior
Senate bill. The citizen's remedy against those conspiring to de-
prive one of his civil rights was as "effective as the redress against
the county, without liability against the inhabitants of it, would
have been."'
When viewed in its historical context, section 1983 loses much
of its effect. The House would not adopt the bill as long as counties
and cities were to be liable for deprivations of civil rights occurring
within their boundaries. While the rejected bill may have encom-
passed a liability that was too broad, it remains that the Act was
adopted without provision for any county or city liability. Though
section 1983 has been an effective weapon in the crusade to protect
civil rights, to extend it to situations involving counties or cities is
to deny the obvious intention of its drafters."'
"I STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, CIVIL RIGHTS, PART I 652 (B.
Schwartz ed. 1970).
" Id. at 653.
18, Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), decided the question of
whether a county was a suable person under section 1983 in the negative. The Court
relied upon Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), for its holding, saying:
In Monroe, the Court, in examining the legislative evolution of the
Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, which is the source of § 1983, pointed
out that Senator Sherman introduced an amendment which would have
added to the Act a new section providing expressly for municipal liability
in civil actions based on the deprivation of civil rights. Although the
amendment was passed by the Senate, it was rejected by the House, as
was another version included in the first Conference Committee report.
The proposal for municipal liability encountered strong held views in the
House on the part of both its supporters and opponents, but the root of
the proposal's difficulties stemmed from serious legislative concern as to
Congress' constitutional power to impose liability on political subdivi-
sions of the States.
M1It cannot be doubted that the House arrived at the firm conclu-
sion that Congress lacked the constitutional power to impose liability
upon municipalities. . . . Thus, § 1983 is unavailable to these petition-
ers insofar as they seek to sue the County.
411 U.S. at 707-10.
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The historical problems facing one bringing an action under
section 1983 disappear when the suit is framed in the context of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.182 EEOA amends
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act"8 3 which gave federal district
courts jurisdiction over actions brought to abate discriminatory
employment practices. Section 701 of the 1964 Act expressly ex-
cluded from the definition of an employer covered by the Act: "A
State or political subdivision thereof. . . ." The 1972 Act deleted
this exemption and authorized the district court, upon finding an
unlawful employment practice, to enjoin the defendant and order
affirmative relief that includes back pay."4 Conflicts between the
eleventh amendment and the EEOA are manifest. The remedies
EEOA provides against the state, the amendment takes away.
While other political subdivisions cannot take advantage of the
eleventh amendment immunity under the EEOA, if the pleader
brings his action under section 1983 he faces the conclusive argu-
ment that counties and cities are not citizens for purposes of that
section.' When the claim is brought against the state, the elev-
enth amendment knocks out the claimant under either statute.
The result of all this is that the relief now believed to exist against
deprivation of civil rights is, in many cases, only a fiction.
Ill. THE FUTURE OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY
While the eleventh amendment as now interpreted may be
In Cross v. Board of Supervisors, 326 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Cal. 1968), afj'd, 442
F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1971), plaintiff named the County of San Mateo as a defendant
in the action. The court cited Monroe v. Pape in holding that political subdivisions
of a state are immune from liability under the Civil Rights Act. The same result
was reached in Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 356 F. Supp. 380 (S.D. Ohio 1973), where
plaintiff named as a defendant in a conspiracy action the Muskingum County
Children's Services Board. The court stated that the Board was created by state
statute and was an agent of the county and, therefore, as an entity, was immune
from suit under section 1983 because the suit was in actuality one against the
county. Again, Monroe was cited as authority. The court noted that the individual
defendants could not claim immunity under section 1983 as they were being sued
in their individual capacities for their alleged unconstitutional actions.
See generally City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973), with respect to
cities not being persons for purposes of section 1983.
In 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1972) [hereinafter referred to as EEOA].
,13 Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701-16, 78 Stat. 253-66.
Is 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1972).
I' See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973); City of Kenosha v.
Bruno. 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
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consistent with post-Chisholm opinion, it is inconsistent with the
policy that every wrong should have a remedy. It cannot be denied
that the amendment creates inconsistencies with respect to the
policy enunciated in the civil rights acts of providing affirmative
relief to those injured, including back pay. ' No evidence has been
found where Congress considered these problems. Apparently the
issues were not raised prior to passage of the Acts. The problems
have erupted in the courts, however, and absent congressional ac-
tion, they do not appear conducive to a ready solution.
The trend today is away from sovereign immunity, and many
states have abolished it judicially and legislatively.'87 The federal
government has abolished its immunity with respect to specific
claims, such as the Federal Employers Liability Act'u and the
Federal Tort Claims Act. 8' Sovereign immunity is fast becoming
an anachronism in our society. Rather than destroy it piece by
piece in the courts, the best approach is to repeal the eleventh
amendment and establish the policy that all wrongs are to be
181 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1972). Attorneys' fees are also contemplated by the
Act. Id. § 2000e-5(k).
The question of awarding attorneys' fees in an action for deprivation of civil
rights under section 1983 is within the discretion of the court. Attorneys' fees are
not awarded as a matter of right but normally are granted in situations where the
plaintiff has acted as a private attorney general or where there has been deliberate
wrongdoing on the part of the defendant. Attorneys' fees are awarded in other
instances where the court deems them proper.
It seems logical that where money damages are proscribed by the eleventh
amendment, an award of attorneys' fees would also be prohibited. However, the
Ninth Circuit held otherwise in Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 888 (9th
Cir. 1974). The private attorney general concept was discussed further in Wilder-
ness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Section 1983 makes no provision for such award, and such fees should be
allowed only when public policy requires it. In Smith v. City of East Cleveland, 363
F. Supp. 1131, 1151 (N.D. Ohio 1973), it was stated that "[the Court should
consider the degree to which a public right is asserted by plaintiff and the extent
to which defendant has engaged in deliberate wrongdoing" in determining whether
to award attorney fees. Again, the award is left in the discretion of the court.
I" See Note, Torts-Governmental Immunity in West Virginia-Long Live the
King?, 76 W. VA. L. REv. 543 (1974).
West Virginia presents a particular problem with regard to state immunity as
it is incorporated into the state constitution. W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 35. However,
any abrogation of immunity in the federal system hopefully will be complete
enough to encompass all federal actions without regard to a state's own claim to
sovereignty.
IS 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970).
199 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-80 (1970).
36
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 77, Iss. 4 [2019], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol77/iss4/6
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
compensated. Even though Edelman has stopped the erosion of
immunity, it can be only a matter of time before the courts begin
to carve out exceptions until the amendment becomes worthless.
If our Constitution is to have any effect, we should follow it, and
if it no longer serves our needs, we should change it, not destroy it
piecemeal until the desired result is achieved. The dangers inher-
ent in judicial constitutional amendment should alarm every citi-
zen, not just the legal purist.
In considering abrogation of sovereign immunity, the theories
behind its inception should be considered. The judiciary has taken
the abstract doctrine for granted, finding it based in history that
they too often have failed to explore. Justice Iredell's lengthy dis-
sent in Chisholm was based on sovereign immunity as supposedly
recognized under English common law. 9 ' There is a conflict among
the writers whether the petition of right granting relief against the
awesome sovereign was mandatory or discretionary.' Regardless
of the outcome of such debate, the historical argument is not very
persuasive today.'92
Public policy has been another major theory of sovereign im-
munity.'93 Justice Davis noted over a hundred years ago that with-
out the protection of sovereign immunity "the government would
be unable to perform the various duties for which it was cre-
ated."'94 A more recent assertion of the public policy justification
came from Chief Justice Vinson: "[T]he government, as repre-
sentative of the community as a whole, cannot be stopped in its
tracks."'95 The fears expressed by these jurists have failed to ma-
terialize while the front of public policy continues to deny justice
to deserving claimants injured by the state.'9' Public policy has not
" See notes 61-64 supra and accompanying text.
Compare H. STREmr, GovERN mNTAL LuBmrrY, A COMPAmRTwVE STUDY 1-2, 15
(1953), arguing that the sovereign had unqualified discretion in granting or denying
a petition of right, with Guthrie, The Eleventh Article of Amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States, 8 COLUmn. L. Rav. 183, 191 (1908), asserting the manda-
tory nature of the petition.
92 See Note, The Present Status of the Eleventh Amendment, 10 VAND. L. REv.
425, 427 (1957), citing United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 208 (1882).
,13 JACOBS, supra note 2, at 153.
,' Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122, 126 (1869).
,9 Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949).
,' The theory that the eleventh amendment was passed because the states
were afraid that they would have to pay Revolutionary debts owed non-citizens is
strongly criticized in JACOBS, supra note 2, at 69-71, where he argues that most of
the debts had already been paid by the time the amendment was ratified.
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barred negative relief, however, as distinguished from the affirma-
tive relief prohibited by the courts.19 No rationale exists for such
a distinction. If public policy requires that a state be immune from
suit, such prohibition should extend to both affirmative and nega-
tive relief.
The conceptual rationale 8 was portrayed by Justice Holmes
in his statement in Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, that "[a] sover-
eign is exempt from suit. . . on the logical and practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes
the law on which the right depends."'' This theory, seemingly a
combination of the historical and public policy rationales, runs
afoul of the ideas expressed by Justice Wilson in his Chisholm
opinion. For him, "[t]he sovereign, when traced to his source,
must be found in the man." '' Thus the authority that makes the
law would, in Wilson's analysis, be the people, making Holmes's
argument rather absurd.
None of the above theories is realistic or workable. They all
represent attempts to justify an irreconcilable position that
reaches an unconscionable level in the modem world. One author
suggests that the immunity rests on judicial inference rather than
express constitutional command and, therefore, can be erased ju-
dicially.2"' While judicial action might provide a current solution,
the only positive method of destroying the injustice inherent in
"I Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1, 10 (1891). The Court made a distinc-
tion between two types of suits involving the state. The first is where a suit is
brought against state officials as they represent the state's action and liability. Here
the state, though not named on the record, is the real party against whom the
judgment would operate, requiring it to specifically perform its contracts. The
second occurs when a suit is brought against defendants who, allegedly acting as
officers of the state, but under an unconstitutional statute, commit wrongs against
the person or property of another. Actions of the first type are barred by the elev-
enth amendment but those of the second category face no such barrier.
I This term was coined in JACOBS, supra note 2, at 154.
19 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
2- Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 458 (1793).
21 The amendment's restriction, however, is not equivalent to an affirmation
of state immunity nor does it constitutionalize legal irresponsibility as a state's
right. In this perspective, a judicial construction of due process of the fourteenth
amendment imposing upon the states a constitutional obligation to provide effec-
tive means of legal redress for wrongs attributable to the states would present no
direct conflict with the injunction of the eleventh amendment. It would on the other
hand, comport with deeply rooted sentiments that found eloquent expression in
Chisholm v. Georgia and that have been repeated with continuing conviction, in
ensuing years. JACOBS, supra note 2, at 164.
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sovereign immunity is to abrogate the immunity constitutionally.
If this nation is going to recognize a cause of action for the depriva-
tion of civil rights and other wrongs visited upon the public by
government, then there must be an accompanying effective relief,
a relief that is available to all regardless of the status of the wrong-
doer.
Devon L. Gosnell
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